In public debates as well as in research on sustainable development, in technology assessment, and in transformation processes, there are regular calls for social and ecological aspects to be considered together. There have long been activities and research projects dedicated to these issues in one way or another. However, this has not yet led to a systematic identification of and differentiation between two fundamentally different concepts of ‘social’. According to the thesis put forward here, such a differentiation is essential in order to make progress in understanding and dealing with socio-ecological transformations and technology’s major role therein.

On the one hand, ‘social’ refers to social relations within society in the narrower sense; on the other hand, ‘social’ means the social aspects in society-nature relations. Why this distinction is fundamental can be discussed in various ways (Lorenz 2024a) and easily illustrated with the following example. In an interview on the occasion of launching the Planetary Boundaries Report, the lead author said:

“Transgressing a boundary increases the risk that human activities could inadvertently drive the Earth System into a much less hospitable state, damaging efforts to reduce poverty and leading to a deterioration of human wellbeing in many parts of the world, including wealthy countries.” (PIK)

At first glance, statements of this kind seem entirely plausible. What is obviously meant is that if living conditions deteriorate, e.g. harvests are at risk, there will be less for the poor to distribute. At second glance, however, one has to ask what the ecological situation actually has to do with efforts or lack of efforts to fight poverty. Because whether or not you fight it has nothing to do with whether there is more or less to distribute. You can distribute abundance just as fairly as shortage – or unfairly, indeed. If you do not take this into account, you are committing a naturalistic fallacy by simplistic transfer from ecology to social relations. Like other social issues, questions of justice are categorically different from ecological questions.

Like other social issues, questions of justice are categorically different from ecological questions.

How can the relationship between ecology and the social be understood when there are such categorical differences, but just as obviously many empirical connections? I will discuss this below by distinguishing between direct and indirect consequences of socio-ecological constellations, which can be derived from the two concepts of ‘social’. Direct socio-ecological problems are those that affect the immediate interaction of social and ecological forces, the society-nature relationship, i.e., that shape this relationship as such technologically, for example as intervention in ecosystems through the construction of dams.

At this point, it should be noted that the term ‘society-nature relations’ that I use does not correspond to the similar-sounding terms (‘societal relations to nature’/‘societal relationships with nature’) used in the Frankfurt concept (Berghöfer et al. 2022; Hummel et al. 2024); in their concept, no distinction is made between the two social terms, nor between direct and indirect connections between society and nature, as I propose here. And they do not stress this specific role of technology. The latter is more reminiscent of the Viennese concept of social metabolism, which, however, does not share the sociological references of my proposal (Fischer-Kowalski et al. 2014; Fischer-Kowalski et al. 2024).

Cartesian dualism has been repeatedly analyzed in the history of ideas as a fundamental problem of modern societies (Gloy 1995, 1996). Bruno Latour’s essay “We have never been modern” (1993) offers a prominent variant of this criticism in ecological discourse. The separation of nature and society, he states, is the great error of modernity and obscures the actual interconnectedness of the two. In particular, the science and technology studies on scientific laboratory research and technological developments, from which the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) emerged, revealed such social-material networks. Consequently, this kind of new materialism levels out the differences between society and nature and also seeks to overcome them conceptually, for example, Latour speaks of collectives or assemblies of human and non-human entities.

However, it is also no coincidence that Latour became highly relevant for the eco-discourse, but not for the social question, i.e., the fundamental problems such as poverty and inequality in modern societies. The opening example from the Planetary Boundaries Report makes it clear to see why this is the case: The difference between social and ecological issues requires a categorical separation that ANT does not want to accept. Ulrich Beck’s “formula: poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic” (1992, p. 36, italics in original) demonstrated a sense for this separation. In turn, he was often criticized for this by social science researchers into inequality, because environmental burdens are unequally distributed, meaning that such a separation from the social question cannot be maintained. These discussions show that both perspectives – emphasizing either the ecological or the social issues – attempt to conceptualize the other one as a partial aspect of their own. From the ecological perspective, the social issue is dissolved in the interconnectedness of nature and society; from the social perspective, ecological problems appear to be the result of unequal conditions with correspondingly unequally distributed consequences. Both perspectives present theoretical solutions at the expense of the other. Obviously, it is difficult to find a common conceptual basis for these opposing approaches to the problem, which are defended by different theoretical perspectives. My proposal below is therefore to broaden perspectives by combining Latour’s (1993, 2004) theoretical approach to ecological analysis with Habermas’ (1984) normatively sensitive theory of society, which encompasses issues of justice as well as conflicts of values and opposing interests.

The opposites may be less problematic than the controversial positions suggest, if one admits that both perspectives have their justification. After all, ecological problems are relevant to social issues like inequality, but are not absorbed by it. They are social in their own respect, which must be categorically distinguished also from the classic social question.

It is not surprising that ecological problems in unequal societies are also dealt with under the sign of inequality. However, there can be no clear empirical correlation (Diekmann et al. 2023) because the problems are categorically different.

The one ‘social’ therefore refers in the narrower sense to social relations, relations between social groups within society with regard to – following the examples above – justice, interests or inequality. Whether things are just or unjust in terms of poverty, as the initial example shows, relates solely to these social relations. The latter need social science analysis and cannot be derived from ecological circumstances by natural sciences (naturalistic fallacy). The other ‘social’ refers to society-nature relations, and with respect to these relations also ‘ecological’ always means social-ecological – this is the field of science and technology studies. But just as it is irrelevant for justice how much there is available for distribution, it is irrelevant for (social-)ecological questions, i.e., for the technologically designed society-nature relationship, whether society is organized justly or not. A just society can overexploit its biophysical environment just as well as an unjust one, and the use of more sustainable technologies, such as wind turbines and solar panels, does not automatically make society fairer.

The task, which may seem confusing at first glance, is therefore to both connect and separate conceptually. The relationship between society and nature must be conceived as connected, intermingled, networked, from which independent questions of social relations must be categorically separated. This can be achieved through a model of society that gives technology its own formative place in the society-nature relationship, as shown schematically in Fig. 1.

Unlike the model of Brand (2017), which also distinguishes economy, state, culture and technology as main forces for socio-ecological transformation, my diagram illustrates socio-ecological constellations in which technologies become directly relevant for the relationship between society and nature. For this relationship, I have introduced Latour/ANT as a key reference. On the societal side, the functional subsystems economy and state as well as the cultural aspects of lifeworld will be shown separately below in line with Habermas’ (1984) theory of society. Combining these theoretical perspectives allows a more differentiated discussion of their direct and indirect consequences for ecological issues in the following section.

Directly relevant to ecological overuse are the technological forms of society-nature relations. Technologies have an independent role to play here; I will come back to this below. In the second instance, the questions then arise: Who operates technologies and why? And to what extent does this indirectly cause also ecological consequences? ‘Indirectly’ here means that there are specific social purposes or aspects – be they driven by norms, values or interests – to which the operations and actions are aligned, which produce ecological consequences as side effects that are not considered per se, but may require additional attention.

According to Fig. 1, this can be discussed more specifically for economy, political regulation and cultural interpretations. The calculation of economic profits and accumulations follows its own patterns. It is not ecologically relevant per se but is mediated through the use of technologies. Profits and losses are calculated according to social interests and given market conditions, and available technologies are used for this purpose. This is primarily a matter of calculation and not of ecological effects, even if these do in fact exist – this is what indirect means. The indirect nature of the connection is by no means a new insight, but has long been used in environmental economics when prices are assigned to ecological effects so that they can be taken into account economically (Pigou 1920). Similarly, Luhmann’s systems theory of differentiation (1989) also argued that ecological problems must be introduced into the functional subsystems of society on the basis of their own operational logic, i.e., into the economy through prices and payment decisions. However, Luhmann’s analysis did not take into account the mediating role of technology.

Theories that do not make such differentiations run into explanatory problems. For Latour and ANT, it has already been explained that while they successfully discuss ecological problems as scientific-technological networking problems, they lose analytical grip on categorically different social issues. In contrast, theories of capitalism ultimately attribute ecological problems to production relations and the logic of accumulation. They fail, however, to recognize that ecological problems are always mediated by science and technology and that technologies have their own role to play. This cannot be reduced solely to economic calculation, accumulation requirements, or ownership relations, even if these have – indirect – empirical consequences. One example is provided by Foster et al. (2010) who understand the ecological crisis as ‘Capitalism’s war on the earth’ – the subtitle of their book. This assessment in the book hinges on their diagnosis that the capitalist economy is ruthless towards ecological living conditions. However, ruthless ignorance is different from waging war against something. It means that ecological conditions are not taken into account in economic decisions and processes. The ecological problem is therefore an indirect one: Whether ecological conditions are endangered or not is not examined, it simply does not matter for economic enterprises. The theory of functional differentiation says nothing else.

Whether ecological conditions are endangered or not is not examined, it simply does not matter for economic enterprises.

This does not indicate how strong or weak the influence of the capitalist economy actually is. Conceptually, it only states that ecological problems resulting from economic activities must be understood as indirect problems mediated by the use of technology. What constitutes the decisive force with regard to ecological problems is then an empirical question, not a question of principle. It depends on the constellation in the interaction of economy, technology and biophysical conditions. And beyond that, on political regulation and on culture, for which the same applies as for the economy: that they take ecological effect indirectly, i.e., mediated by science and technology. Cultural understandings of prosperity, for example, can have more or less resource- and energy-intensive implications. How environmentally problematic energy consumption finally is, however, depends largely on the technologies that are used. Another example is the cultural understanding of nature. In order for more ecologically friendly ideas to become effective, they need to be put into practice via science and technology. First, they must be based on scientific findings that make an ecological problem visible in the first place, for example on measurements of the CO₂ content of the atmosphere or on investigated threats to species and their consequences in ecosystems.

Mirroring the dual understanding of ‘social’, the term ecology also has two meanings. From a natural science perspective, it refers to ecosystems of biophysical nature, whereas from a sustainability and transformation perspective, it is assigned to the society-nature relationship, i.e. a social-ecological one.

In other words, economic, political-regulatory and cultural modes of operation and action can become ecologically relevant and then require translation into sustainable science and technology modes from a transformation perspective. Conversely, the technological shaping of society-nature relations requires translation in order to become economically, politically-administratively and culturally relevant and workable. Such analytical distinctions make it possible to examine empirically how indirect consequences can have an impact. Only then can it be understood how and to what extent social and ecological processes interact – ideally reinforcing each other positively (win-win) or weakening each other, or asserting themselves at the expense of the other.

The idea of ‘translations’ is reminiscent of an early concept of ANT (Callon 1986), which recognizes that actors follow different modes of operation and action. In order to interact in networks, these different modes must be coordinated and translated for this purpose. In principle, as shown, differentiation theories of society also state this in a similar way and Latour himself has taken a differentiation theory approach in his social theory work later (Latour 2004, 2013).

To discuss this further in terms of the mutual relationship between economy and technology, it is analytically crucial to recognize that within these fields primarily dominate own logics of operation and action, namely calculation in economy and manipulation in technology (Lorenz 2021, pp. 56–60, 2024b, p. 148):

Economy uses technology to increase profits; technology is a means to this end. The basis of profit is not directly the technology as technology, but the calculation with technology as a means of production or a commodity. Entrepreneurs are not primarily interested in the new technological possibilities, but in the extent to which these can be sold in order to generate profits. Profit interests may motivate investment in technology development, but profit calculation does not itself invent new technologies.

Technologies intervene in biophysical relationships in order to shape material conditions. Technological innovations can be sold in order to utilize resources for new technological developments. Here, sales profit is the means to the end of funding technological innovation. The basis of innovation is not profit as profit, but as an indirect resource to mobilize scope for further manipulation. Inventors in engineering, or scientists in basic research are not primarily interested in making a calculated profit, but in ‘changing the world’ through technological interventions.

The aforementioned interests of entrepreneurs vs. inventors describe them analytically in their role within the respective operational logic. It is obvious that there are empirically more or less scientifically and technically curious entrepreneurs as well as more or less business-minded engineers and scientists. However, an analytical distinction is required in order to examine the empirical interaction. This also applies to the influence of money on technology, for example by investing in certain fields of innovation – or by holding on to old, still profitable technologies. The influence on technological innovation remains indirect, as technological development follows its own analytically independent dynamic. What is possible in terms of technological development depends primarily on the state of scientific and technological development itself. And the inherent dynamic is essentially fed by the fact that technologies not only create solutions but also new problems that are solved then with new technologies, which in turn create problems that are again dealt with technologically, etc. (Beck 1992; Latour 1993; Lorenz 2017, 2024b).

In addition, Mitchell (2009), for example, has shown that changes in society-nature relations can have a massive indirect impact on social relations through the use of new technologies. The transition from coal to oil changed the technologies used, the associated organization of work and ultimately the options for representing social interests in the energy industries. More recent examples would include the transition to electromobility in the automotive industry, or from coal to wind or solar power. Thus, not only do social relations have indirect consequences for nature-society relations, but the reverse is also true.

The idea presented here is that there should be a clear-cut distinction between the two concepts of ‘social’ in the discussions about sustainable development and socio-ecological transformations. The ‘social’ of relations within society is categorically different from that of society-nature relations. This has far-reaching consequences in analytical and transformative terms. Analytically, findings from theoretical perspectives that have so far competed for interpretations of socio-ecological issues must be considered together. I am referring in particular to the combination of theoretical perspectives offered by Habermas and Latour. From a transformative perspective, the mutual connections and translations in socio-ecological constellations (Fig. 1) must be taken into account, both the direct and even more so the indirect ones. The fact that this also requires improved cooperation between the natural and social sciences is not a new insight, but it does provide a more systematic conceptual basis. This also helps to avoid naturalistic fallacies, such as the one demonstrated in the opening example. Natural science findings on the biophysical consequences of technological use, as provided by planetary boundary studies, are essential for socio-ecological research and policy. However, they do not allow any direct conclusions to be drawn about how society deals with them. This always requires social science research and interdisciplinary translational reflection: To what extent do economic decisions, political regulations, or cultural interpretations and values promote technologically mediated interventions in biophysical-ecological processes?

The ‘social’ of relations within society is categorically different from that of society-nature relations.

The analytical task is to examine where there are direct and indirect consequences of socio-ecological activities and how they are empirically related to specific problems in transformation processes. It is the indirect interplay in particular that makes it so difficult to respond to them politically, because indirect effects need to be taken into account for transformative translations. Moreover, the indirect connections are even more complex because they also link the different social fields, e.g., when political control aims to pursue ecological goals via economic means, like eco-taxes or CO₂ prices. The results depend on translations within the constellation and are therefore less precise and susceptible to unintended effects. Because this is unavoidable, the proposed analytical distinctions are needed in order to systematically consider such effects.